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Comparative Analysis of Patch Attack on VLM-Based Autonomous Driving Architectures

arXiv cs.CV / 3/11/2026

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Key Points

  • The paper evaluates the robustness of three vision-language model (VLM) architectures—Dolphins, OmniDrive (Omni-L), and LeapVAD—used in autonomous driving against physical adversarial patch attacks.
  • Using black-box optimization combined with semantic homogenization, the study conducts a fair and systematic comparison of these models within the CARLA simulation environment.
  • Findings demonstrate severe vulnerabilities in all tested architectures, including sustained multi-frame failures and significant degradation in object detection performance under adversarial conditions.
  • The analysis reveals distinct patterns of architectural weaknesses, indicating that current VLM-based autonomous driving designs do not sufficiently mitigate adversarial threats in safety-critical contexts.
  • The work highlights the urgent need for developing more robust VLM architectures to improve safety and reliability in autonomous driving systems against physical adversarial attacks.

Computer Science > Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition

arXiv:2603.08897 (cs)
[Submitted on 9 Mar 2026]

Title:Comparative Analysis of Patch Attack on VLM-Based Autonomous Driving Architectures

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Abstract:Vision-language models are emerging for autonomous driving, yet their robustness to physical adversarial attacks remains unexplored. This paper presents a systematic framework for comparative adversarial evaluation across three VLM architectures: Dolphins, OmniDrive (Omni-L), and LeapVAD. Using black-box optimization with semantic homogenization for fair comparison, we evaluate physically realizable patch attacks in CARLA simulation. Results reveal severe vulnerabilities across all architectures, sustained multi-frame failures, and critical object detection degradation. Our analysis exposes distinct architectural vulnerability patterns, demonstrating that current VLM designs inadequately address adversarial threats in safety-critical autonomous driving applications.
Comments:
Subjects: Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.08897 [cs.CV]
  (or arXiv:2603.08897v1 [cs.CV] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.08897
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arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

Submission history

From: David Fernandez [view email]
[v1] Mon, 9 Mar 2026 20:04:13 UTC (17,690 KB)
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