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Quantifying Memorization and Privacy Risks in Genomic Language Models

arXiv cs.LG / 3/11/2026

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Key Points

  • Genomic language models (GLMs) are powerful tools for DNA sequence analysis but pose privacy risks by potentially memorizing sensitive genomic data from training cohorts.
  • The paper introduces a comprehensive, multi-vector privacy evaluation framework combining perplexity-based detection, canary sequence extraction, and membership inference to quantify memorization risks in GLMs.
  • Controlled experiments with planted canary sequences in synthetic and real genomic datasets reveal that repetition rate, model capacity, and training dynamics influence the degree of memorization.
  • The study shows that no single attack method fully captures memorization risk, emphasizing the importance of multi-vector privacy auditing for genomic AI models.
  • These findings highlight critical privacy and regulatory implications for the deployment of GLMs trained on sensitive genetic data, advocating for robust privacy assessment as a standard practice.

Computer Science > Machine Learning

arXiv:2603.08913 (cs)
[Submitted on 9 Mar 2026]

Title:Quantifying Memorization and Privacy Risks in Genomic Language Models

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Abstract:Genomic language models (GLMs) have emerged as powerful tools for learning representations of DNA sequences, enabling advances in variant prediction, regulatory element identification, and cross-task transfer learning. However, as these models are increasingly trained or fine-tuned on sensitive genomic cohorts, they risk memorizing specific sequences from their training data, raising serious concerns around privacy, data leakage, and regulatory compliance. Despite growing awareness of memorization risks in general-purpose language models, little systematic evaluation exists for these risks in the genomic domain, where data exhibit unique properties such as a fixed nucleotide alphabet, strong biological structure, and individual identifiability. We present a comprehensive, multi-vector privacy evaluation framework designed to quantify memorization risks in GLMs. Our approach integrates three complementary risk assessment methodologies: perplexity-based detection, canary sequence extraction, and membership inference. These are combined into a unified evaluation pipeline that produces a worst-case memorization risk score. To enable controlled evaluation, we plant canary sequences at varying repetition rates into both synthetic and real genomic datasets, allowing precise quantification of how repetition and training dynamics influence memorization. We evaluate our framework across multiple GLM architectures, examining the relationship between sequence repetition, model capacity, and memorization risk. Our results establish that GLMs exhibit measurable memorization and that the degree of memorization varies across architectures and training regimes. These findings reveal that no single attack vector captures the full scope of memorization risk, underscoring the need for multi-vector privacy auditing as a standard practice for genomic AI systems.
Comments:
Subjects: Machine Learning (cs.LG); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Genomics (q-bio.GN)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.08913 [cs.LG]
  (or arXiv:2603.08913v1 [cs.LG] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.08913
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arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

Submission history

From: Alexander Nemecek [view email]
[v1] Mon, 9 Mar 2026 20:30:37 UTC (741 KB)
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