Fluently Lying: Adversarial Robustness Can Be Substrate-Dependent

arXiv cs.CV / 4/2/2026

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Key Points

  • The study challenges a common assumption in adversarial monitoring/defense for object detectors that when mAP drops under attack, the number of detections drops proportionally as well.
  • It reports a “Quality Corruption (QC)” failure mode on a spiking neural network (SNN) object detector (EMS-YOLO), where standard PGD attacks reduce mAP from 0.528 to 0.042 while retaining over 70% of detections.
  • QC is observed only on one of four SNN architectures tested (across both l-infinity and l-2 threat models), indicating that adversarial failure modes may be highly substrate/model-dependent.
  • The authors find that five standard defense components fail to detect or mitigate QC on the affected model, suggesting defenses may be tuned to an inaccurate, cross-substrate coupling assumption.

Abstract

The primary tools used to monitor and defend object detectors under adversarial attack assume that when accuracy degrades, detection count drops in tandem. This coupling was assumed, not measured. We report a counterexample observed on a single model: under standard PGD, EMS-YOLO, a spiking neural network (SNN) object detector, retains more than 70% of its detections while mAP collapses from 0.528 to 0.042. We term this count-preserving accuracy collapse Quality Corruption (QC), to distinguish it from the suppression that dominates untargeted evaluation. Across four SNN architectures and two threat models (l-infinity and l-2), QC appears only in one of the four detectors tested (EMS-YOLO). On this model, all five standard defense components fail to detect or mitigate QC, suggesting the defense ecosystem may rely on a shared assumption calibrated on a single substrate. These results provide, to our knowledge, the first evidence that adversarial failure modes can be substrate-dependent.