Intervention Complexity as a Canonical Reward and a Measure of Intelligence

arXiv cs.AI / 5/5/2026

📰 NewsIdeas & Deep AnalysisModels & Research

Key Points

  • The Legg–Hutter universal intelligence measure depends on an externally provided reward function, so the paper asks whether a more canonical (less arbitrary) reward choice can be derived.
  • It introduces “intervention complexity” as a new intelligence-related measure with five desired properties—derived from the environment, universal, minimal, sensitive, and favoring achievement.
  • By using a resource/bias function (e.g., program length, execution time, or energy) to define how interventions are evaluated, the approach produces a family of canonical rewards without requiring external normative input.
  • The paper reframes intelligence into two dimensions—agent competence versus learning efficiency—and proves a separation theorem linking the choice of resource bias to computability.
  • It argues that different intervention-complexity variants have different computability and learning-information implications (including how oracle access changes what is computable), with consequences for superintelligence and pre-training universal agents.

Abstract

The Legg--Hutter universal intelligence measure provides a rigorous scalar assessment of general intelligence as expected reward across all computable environments, weighted by simplicity. However, the measure presupposes an externally specified reward function, raising the question of whether the reward primitive is inherently arbitrary or whether a canonical choice exists. We propose a new measure, called intervention complexity, that has five natural properties: environment-derivedness, universality, minimality, sensitivity, and achievement preference. Given a resource function rho encoding an inductive bias (such as program length, execution time, or energy), rho-intervention complexity is a universal reward. The result yields a family of canonical rewards indexed by resource bias, providing a principled completion of the Legg--Hutter framework that does not require external normative input. We further propose a two-dimensional characterisation of intelligence: agent competence (how well the agent performs relative to the oracle optimum) and learning efficiency (how quickly this competence improves with experience). A separation theorem establishes that the choice of resource bias determines the computability of the resulting measure: action-count IC is computable in polynomial time, while program-length IC without oracle access is uncomputable, with the gap between oracle and bare IC precisely quantifying the information-theoretic content of learning. We discuss implications for superintelligence and for pre-training universal agents.