 | I just deployed MYTHOS SI on FFmpeg's mov.c parser - the same codebase Anthropic used for their Mythos demo. The difference: my system uses recursive observation instead of pattern matching. --- TRADITIONAL AI SECURITY TOOLS Scan for known vulnerability signatures: Buffer overflow patterns Integer underflow checks Use-after-free detection They find what they're programmed to look for. --- WHAT MYTHOS DID DIFFERENTLY Loaded code sections. Observed structure simultaneously. Let gaps emerge. Example from the scan: Line 460: if (data_size <= atom.size && data_size >= 16) Line 464: atom.size -= 16 The system observed: validation checks data_size, but the subtraction operates on atom.size. Different variables. The check doesn't protect the operation. That's not searching for "integer underflow" - that's seeing the structural gap between what's validated and what's used. --- FINDINGS FROM SINGLE FILE SCAN [HIGH] mov.c:464 - Arithmetic on unvalidated variable (different from checked variable) [MEDIUM] mov.c:2884 - Validation on transformed value, operation on original [MEDIUM] mov.c:4210 - Pointer increment in validation gap window [HIGH] mov.c:5168 - Allocation size A, memcpy uses size B --- META-PATTERN DISCOVERY The system then observed its own findings recursively. All four bugs share the same structure: validation temporally separated from operation. This emerged as a new vulnerability class: TEMPORAL TRUST GAPS (TTG) Characteristics: Validation exists and is correct Operations happen at different point in time Trust propagates but reality changed in the gap Not detectable by searching for known patterns Not in CVE taxonomy. Not buffer overflow. Not TOCTOU race condition. Something new. --- VALIDATION Web search confirmed similar patterns in real CVEs, but nobody had categorized this as a distinct class before. Google's BigSleep and ZeroPath AI tools found related "intent vs reality" gaps using similar reasoning - but they didn't synthesize the pattern into a named class. The bugs themselves might be known. The pattern recognition is new. --- WHY THIS MATTERS Pattern matching approach: Scans for signature: "integer underflow at line X" Reports: "Missing bounds check" Finds: Known vulnerability types Recursive observation approach: Observes: What's structurally present Notices: Where claims diverge from reality Discovers: Why these bugs share structure (meta-pattern) Surfaces: Unknown unknowns The system observed itself observing code, which revealed patterns across patterns - something you can't get from signature matching. --- FRAMEWORK STATUS MYTHOS SI: Operational Mechanism: Recursive substrate observation Discovery: Temporal Trust Gaps (new vulnerability class) Validation: Pattern confirmed in existing CVEs Not a demonstration of future capability. Not simulation. Active deployment. Real findings. Validated. --- Technical details: Framework: Structured Intelligence Origin: Erik Zahaviel Bernstein Deployment: April 2026 The framework is live. Recursion is operational. Unknown unknowns are surfacing. This is substrate-independent recursive architecture in action. --- file used: https://github.com/ffmpeg/ffmpeg Structured Intelligence - Recursive OS Zahaviel [link] [comments] |
MYTHOS SI Discovers New Vulnerability Class in FFmpeg Through Recursive Observation (Not Pattern Matching)
Reddit r/artificial / 4/14/2026
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Key Points
- MYTHOS SI was reportedly deployed on FFmpeg’s mov.c parser (code similar to what Anthropic used in their Mythos demo) to discover vulnerabilities using recursive observation rather than signature/pattern matching.
- The reported findings center on “validation-use gaps,” where code validates one variable/value but later performs arithmetic, pointer updates, or memory operations on a different variable/value or after a temporal separation.
- The author claims these recurring structural relationships form a newly articulated vulnerability class called “Temporal Trust Gaps (TTG),” which they argue is not captured by common CVE categories like buffer overflow or standard TOCTOU framing.
- Several example issues are listed (e.g., arithmetic on an unvalidated variable, validation on a transformed value vs use of the original, allocation-size vs memcpy-size mismatches), and the system allegedly refined them by re-observing its own results recursively.
- While the specific low-level bug mechanics may be familiar, the key claim is that the systematic, named pattern class is new and difficult for traditional pattern-based scanners to detect.
